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We study upstream horizontal mergers and their potential efficiency gains. We show that an 
upstream horizontal merger can give rise to two efficiency-enhancing effects when firms trade 
through two-part tariffs. It increases R&D investments and decreases wholesale prices when 
downstream competition is not too strong. Examining whether the merger’s potential 
efficiency gains can overcome its anti-competitive effects in terms of welfare, we show that 
when firms merge usually both of the above mentioned efficiencies are realized and they are 
passed on to consumers. This holds to a lesser extend when firms trade through linear 
contracts. 
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Horizontal mergers occur very often and in almost all markets. The antitrust authorities have
traditionally been hostile towards them. Their hostility has been mainly based on the idea that
a horizontal merger can increase monopoly power, thereby reducing competition and increasing
prices. Horizontal mergers, however, may also alter ﬁrms’ investment incentives and generate
eﬃciency gains. The latter could play a crucial role in determining the eﬀect of mergers on
consumer and total welfare. Accordingly, the antitrust authorities should consider whether or
not eﬃciency gains are likely to oﬀset the mergers’ anticompetitive eﬀects. This is precisely the
approach adopted in the most recent Merger Guidelines both in the U.S. and in EU. According
to the former, the US Department of Justice “...will not challenge a merger if eﬃciencies are
suﬃcient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm consumers in the relevant market” (US
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 1997, section 4). Similarly, according to the new European
Merger Guidelines, the Commission “... may decide that, as a consequence of the eﬃciencies
the merger brings about, there are no grounds for declaring the merger incompatible with the
common market.” (EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 2004/03, art. 77).
Horizontal mergers in real world markets often take place among suppliers of intermediate
products dealing with ﬁnal product manufacturers or among wholesalers dealing respectively
with retailers.1 In other words, horizontal mergers often occur between ﬁrms that operate in
the upstream markets of vertically related industries. A special characteristic of horizontal
mergers in vertically related industries is that they aﬀect competition not only at the market
level in which they take place but also at the other market level by altering, among other
things, the terms of vertical trading.
In this paper, we study horizontal mergers in the upstream markets of vertically related
industries when both the mergers and the upstream ﬁrms’ R&D investments are endogenous.
We address a number of questions such as: Do upstream horizontal mergers lead to eﬃciency
gains? Are they mainly motivated by increased market power or by cost-synergies? How
do they inﬂuence the trading with the downstream ﬁrms? Can their potential cost-savings
dominate their anti-competitive eﬀects in terms of welfare? What is the role of the contract
types used?
1See e.g., mergers among car equipment suppliers (Kolben-schmidt/Pierburg, Valeo/Engel), producers of
chemical substances (BASF/Engelhard), and mobile phones manufacturers (Sony/Ericsson).
1We construct a model in which there are initially two upstream and two downstream
ﬁrms. The upstream ﬁrms invest in cost-reducing R&D and the downstream ﬁrms produce
diﬀerentiated goods. A four stage game is analyzed. In the ﬁrst stage, the upstream ﬁrms
decide whether or not they will merge. If they merge, they form an upstream monopolist. In
the second stage, the R&D investments are chosen by the upstream ﬁrm(s). In the following
stage, if the merger has occurred then the newly formed upstream monopolist chooses the terms
of the two-part tariﬀ c o n t r a c t st h a ti to ﬀe r st ot h et w od o w n s t r e a mﬁrms. Otherwise, each of
the two independent upstream ﬁrms chooses its terms of trade with its exclusive downstream
customer. In the last stage, the downstream ﬁrms compete in quantities.
We demonstrate that an upstream horizontal merger can give rise to two distinct eﬃciency-
enhancing eﬀects. It increases the eﬀective R&D investments when products are not too close
substitutes, and thus, downstream competition is not too strong. Moreover, it decreases the
wholesale prices unless downstream competition is ﬁerce and the R&D technology is suﬃciently
eﬃcient. The intuition for the merger’s positive impact on R&D investments is that the output
of a merged ﬁrm exceeds that of a separated ﬁrm because a merged ﬁrm sells its products to
two instead of one downstream ﬁrms. Since the merged ﬁrm has larger output, it has stronger
incentives to reduce its cost, and thus, to invest in R&D. The decrease in the wholesale prices
occurs for two reasons. The ﬁr s tr e a s o ni st h a tt h el o w e rc o s tf a c e db yt h em e r g e dﬁrm, due to
its higher R&D investments, allows it to charge lower wholesale prices. The second reason is
that when an upstream ﬁrm increases the wholesale price it charges to one downstream ﬁrm,
the rival downstream ﬁrm’s output increases. Under two-part tariﬀ contracts, the downstream
production is subsidized; hence, the increase in the rival downstream ﬁrm’s output constitutes
a negative externality for the merged ﬁrm. Internalizing this negative externality, the merged
ﬁrm decreases its wholesale prices.
We also demonstrate that upstream ﬁrms merge when products are not too close substitutes
and the R&D technology is suﬃciently eﬃcient. Otherwise, they remain separated. Intuitively,
when downstream competition is too ﬁerce and R&D investments are too costly, the merger
leads to both lower upstream cost-eﬃciency and lower wholesale prices. Thus, the upstream
ﬁrms have a disincentive to merge. Instead, when downstream competition is rather weak, the
merger leads to stronger upstream cost-eﬃciency; hence, the upstream ﬁrms have an incentive
to merge. From this and our above mentioned ﬁndings regarding the merger’s eﬃciency-
enhancing eﬀects, it follows that when ﬁrms merge, usually strong eﬃciency gains are realized.
2These eﬃciencies are passed on to the consumers since the lower wholesale prices translate
into lower prices for the ﬁnal products. As a result, when ﬁrms decide to merge, their merger
usually increases both consumers and total welfare.
Extending our analysis to trading through wholesale price contracts, we ﬁnd that the
upstream ﬁr m sa l w a y sm e r g e . T h e r ea r et w oo p p o s i t ee ﬃciency eﬀects in place then. The
merger always increases the eﬀective R&D investments but it also leads to higher wholesale
prices when products are close substitutes. In the latter case, the merger is also welfare
detrimental since it aggravates the severity of the double marginalization problem. In fact,
an upstream horizontal merger is more likely to be welfare detrimental under wholesale price
contracts than under two-part tariﬀ contracts.
Our ﬁndings clearly indicate that an upstream horizontal merger’s induced eﬃciency gains
can overturn an otherwise anti-competitive merger into a pro-competitive one; hence, the
antitrust authorities should seriously take into account eﬃciency gains in the assessment of
upstream horizontal mergers. More speciﬁcally, in doing so, they should consider, among
other things, the intensity of downstream competition and the contract type used.
There is an extensive literature on the eﬃciency gains of horizontal mergers in one-tier
industries (see e.g., Farrell and Shapiro, 1990, Stenbacka, 1991, Motta and Vasconcelos, 2005,
and Banal-Estañol et al., 2008).2 This literature has focused on the merger’s impact on the
market level in which it takes place and has not taken into account its potential impact on
other market levels. This has started to change recently with a number of papers studying
horizontal mergers in vertically related industries. Most of these papers have focused on the
analysis of downstream horizontal mergers (see e.g., von Ungern-Sternberg, 1996, Dobson
and Waterson, 1997, Inderst and Wey, 2003, Lommerud et al., 2005, Fauli-Oller and Bru,
2008, and Symeonidis, 2008). To the best of our knowledge the only papers on upstream
horizontal mergers are those of Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Ziss (1995), O’Brien and Shaﬀer
(2003), Inderst and Wey (2003), and Milliou and Petrakis (2007).3 With the exception of
Inderst and Wey (2003) none of these papers have considered the potential eﬃciency gains of
upstream horizontal mergers. Inderst and Wey (2003), in examining, among other things, how
an upstream horizontal merger aﬀects R&D investments, have considered a quite restrictive
2For a review of this literature see Roller et al. (2001).
3de Fontenay and Gans (2005) have also compared upstream monopoly with upstream competition but have
focused on the incentives for vertical integration.
3environment in which there is no downstream competition and only one of the upstream ﬁrms
can undertake a ﬁxed R&D investment. We extend this literature by considering instead a
market characterized by downstream competition, as well as by allowing for an endogenous
level of R&D investments and for a number of diﬀerent scenarios regarding the contractual
arrangements used among the vertically related ﬁrms. Doing so, we contribute to the literature
by providing an in depth analysis of the relationship between upstream horizontal mergers and
eﬃciency gains.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our model. In
Section 3, we analyze the merger eﬀects on R&D investments and two-part tariﬀ contracts. In
Section 4, we explore ﬁrms’ merger incentives. In Section 5, we extent our analysis to trading
through wholesale price contracts. In Section 6, we perform a welfare analysis and draw some
policy conclusions. In Section 7, we discuss a number of extensions of our model. We conclude
in Section 8. All the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a vertically related industry in which initially there are two upstream and two
downstream ﬁrms denoted respectively by Ui and Di,w i t hi =1 ,2. There is an exclusive
relation between Ui and Di.4 Each Di obtains an input from Ui, transforms it into a ﬁnal
product in a one-to-one relation and sells it to the ﬁnal consumers facing the following (inverse)
demand function:
pi = a − qi − γqj,i 6= j, i,j =1 ,2, 0 ≤ γ<1,
where qi and pi are respectively the quantity and the price of Di’s ﬁnal product and γ measures
product substitutability. The higher is γ, the closer substitutes the products of Di and Dj are.
The two upstream ﬁrms can merge or they can remain separated. If they remain separated,
then each separate upstream ﬁrm Ui faces a unit production cost given by c−xi,w h e r exi are
4This is a common assumption in the literature (see e.g., Horn and Wolinsky, 1988, Gal-Or, 1991, Lommerud
et al., 2005, Milliou et al., 2007, and Milliou and Petrakis, 2007). Moreover, exclusive relations are common
in many industries (e.g., car manufacturers often use exclusive car dealers, gasoline retailers are often bond to
petroleum ﬁrms with exclusive contracts). An important source of exclusive relations is the existence of high
switching costs. The latter can arise when the upstream ﬁrms produce inputs that are tailored for speciﬁc
downstream ﬁrms.
4its cost-reducing R&D investments and c,w i t ha>c>0, is its initial unit production cost.
In line with d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and many others, we assume that the R&D
investments are subject to diminishing returns, captured by the quadratic form of their cost,
mx2
i/2,w i t hm>0. Clearly, the higher is m the lower is the eﬃciency of the R&D technology.
If the two upstream ﬁrms merge, a monopolist, denoted by U, is formed in the upstream
market. U’s unit production cost is given by c − xU,w i t hxU denoting U’s R&D investments.
U’s R&D investments decrease the production cost of the inputs that it sells to both down-
stream ﬁrms, i.e., its R&D investments are not ﬁrm-speciﬁc.5 Similarly to the case of separate
upstream ﬁrms, the cost of the R&D investments of the upstream monopolist is mx2
U/2.
Each Di faces no other cost than the cost of obtaining the input from its upstream supplier.
This cost includes a per-unit of input wholesale price, wi,a n daﬁxed fee, fi, which constitutes a
transfer from Di to its respective upstream supplier. Clearly, this means that trading between
the upstream and downstream ﬁrms takes place through non-linear two-part tariﬀ contracts.
Competitive interactions are modeled as a four-stage game with observable actions. In stage
one, the upstream ﬁrms decide whether or not to merge horizontally. As mentioned above,
when they merge they form an upstream monopolist. In stage two, the upstream ﬁrm(s) choose
the level of their R&D investments. In the following stage, stage three, the upstream ﬁrm(s)
make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to the downstream ﬁrms regarding their terms of trade. Finally,
in stage four, the downstream ﬁrms compete in the ﬁnal market in quantities.6
The above timing captures the idea that ﬁrms’ merger decisions are strategic decisions with
longer run characteristics than their decisions regarding R&D investments. This is a standard
assumption in the literature (see e.g., Inderst and Wey, 2003, Fauli-Oller et al., 2007). The
above timing also reﬂects our assumption that investments are noncontractible. In other words,
we embody the standard incomplete contracts framework that corresponds to assuming that
the speciﬁc contract terms are set after the investment stage. A standard justiﬁcation for this
assumption is the diﬃculty of contractually specifying all aspects of performance (see e.g.,
Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1988, and Segal, 1999).
5Alternatively, U could undertake ﬁrm-speciﬁcR & Di n v e s t m e n t s ,x1 and x2, such that its variable production
cost is (c−x1)q1+(c−x2)q2. In our setting, U earns higher proﬁt sw h e ni t sR & Di n v e s t m e n t sa r en o tﬁrm-speciﬁc
than when they are ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Thus, U prefers to undertake R&D investments which are not ﬁrm-speciﬁc.
6Note that in our setting, as e.g., in Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Gal-Or (1991), McAfee and Schwartz (1995),
and Milliou and Petrakis (2007), the contract terms are observed before downstream competition takes place.
The case in which there is interim unobservability, i.e., a downstream ﬁrm does not observe its rival’s contract
terms in the last stage of the game, is discussed in Section 7.
5It is important to note that when the upstream ﬁrms merge then in the third stage of
the game, the upstream monopolist makes its contract oﬀe r st ot h et w od o w n s t r e a mﬁrms
simultaneously and separately. This could simply be the case because the upstream monopolist
has two representatives, each dealing with a diﬀerent downstream ﬁrm.7 This means that the
upstream monopolist can price discriminate among the downstream ﬁrms.8 As has been noted
in the literature (see e.g., McAfee and Schwartz, 1995), multiple equilibria can arise in such
settings due to the multiplicity of the beliefs that the downstream ﬁrms can form when they
receive out-of-equilibrium oﬀers. As in Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Cremer and Riordan (1987),
O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1992), and Milliou and Petrakis (2007), we obtain a unique equilibrium by
imposing pairwise proofness on the equilibrium contracts. That is, we require that a contract
between U and Di is immune to a bilateral deviation of U with the rival downstream ﬁrm Dj,
holding the contract with Di constant.9
In order to guarantee that all the ﬁrms are active in the market in all the cases under




For notational reasons we use superscripts S and M to denote respectively the equilibrium
values when the upstream ﬁrms have remained separated and when they have merged.
3 Equilibrium R&D Investments and Contract Terms
In the last stage of the game, each Di chooses its output in order to maximize its gross proﬁts:
max
qi
ΠDi =( pi − wi)qi =( a − qi − γqj − wi)qi. (1)
7This is a standard assumption in the literature on multilateral contracting (see e.g., Cremer and Riordan,
1987, Horn and Wolinsky, 1988, Hart and Tirole, 1990, O’Brein and Shaﬀer, 1992, McAfee and Schwartz, 1994
and 1995, and Rey and Vergé, 2004). For additional justiﬁcations of this assumption see McAfee and Schwartz
(1995).
8In Section 7, we brieﬂy discuss what could happen if price discrimination was not allowed.
9Hart and Tirole (1990), McAfee and Schwartz (1994, 1995), Rey and Vergé (2004), and de Fontenay and
Gans (2005, 2006), among others use a similar assumption to that of pairwise proofness. They assume that
downstream ﬁrms have passive beliefs, i.e., they require that when a downstream ﬁrm receives an out-of-
equilibrium oﬀer it continues to believe that its rival receives the equilibrium oﬀer.
10Note that the right hand side of the inequality takes its highest value, 1.44,w h e nγ =1 . The same condition
is suﬃcient for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium when there is an upstream monopolist which trades
through two-part tariﬀ contracts. For the potential non-existence of such equilibrium see e.g., McAfee and
Schwartz (1994, 1995), Rey and Vergé (2004).
6The ﬁrst order conditions give rise to the following reaction functions:
Ri(qj,w i)=
a − wi − γqj
2
. (2)
As it can be seen, a decrease in the wholesale price charged to Di shifts its reaction function
upwards and turns it into a more aggressive competitor in the ﬁnal market. Solving the system
of reaction functions (2), we obtain the Cournot equilibrium quantities expressed in terms of
the wholesale prices:
qi(wi,w j)=
(2 − γ)a − 2wi + γwj
4 − γ2 . (3)
I nl i n ew i t ht h ea b o v e ,w en o t et h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nt h ew h o l e s a l ep r i c eo ﬀered to Di decreases
its output and at the same time increases the output of its rival, Dj.
3.1 Separate Upstream Firms
When the upstream ﬁrms remain separated, there are two competing vertical chains in the
market. In stage three, each upstream ﬁrm Ui chooses wi and fi, taking as given wj and fj,
in order to maximize its net proﬁts:
max
wi,fi





s.t. ΠDi =[ a − qi(wi,w j) − γqj(wi,w j) − wi]qi(wi,w j) ≥ fi









One can easily see from (5) that wi is chosen in order to maximize the joint proﬁts of Ui and
Di.T h eﬁrst order conditions result in:
wi(xi,x j)=
2c[8 − γ2(4 + γ)] − 8xi(2 − γ2)+γ2 [a(γ(2 + γ) − 4) + 2γxj]
16 − 12γ2 + γ4 . (6)
Note that ∂wi
∂xi < 0. T h a ti s ,t h ew h o l e s a l ep r i c et h a tUi charges to Di decreases in its own
cost-reducing R&D investments. At the same time though, its wholesale price increases in its
7rival’s R&D investments, ∂wi
∂xj > 0.
In the previous stage, stage two, each Ui chooses its R&D investments in order to maximize




4(a − c)(8 − 6γ2 + γ4)
m[4 + (2 − γ)γ]2[4 − γ(2 + γ)] − 4(8 − 6γ2 + γ4)
. (7)
Interestingly, there is a U-shaped relationship between the intensity of downstream competi-
tion, measured by γ, and the upstream R&D investments. More speciﬁcally, the upstream
R&D investments decrease in γ if γ<0.67 and increase in γ otherwise. Intuitively, recall
that the constraint in (4) is binding, and thus, that the upstream ﬁrms extract all the down-
stream proﬁts through the ﬁxed fees. Given this, an increase in downstream competition
has two countervailing eﬀects on the upstream R&D investments. First, more downstream
competition means lower proﬁt-margin for the upstream ﬁrms, and in turn, weaker upstream
R&D investment incentives. Second, more downstream competition makes the advantage of
increased eﬃciency more pronounced, and thus, increases the upstream R&D investment in-
centives. When the products are close substitutes, the latter eﬀect gets stronger and dominates
the ﬁrst eﬀect.11
Substituting (7) into (6), we obtain the equilibrium wholesale prices:
wS
i =
4a(8 − 6γ2 + γ4)+m(16 − 12γ2 + γ4)[aγ2 − 2c(2 + γ)]
4(8 − 6γ2 + γ4)+m[4 + (2 − γ)γ]2[γ(2 + γ) − 4]
. (8)
Note that wS
i <c − xS
i . In other words, the upstream ﬁrms subsidize their downstream
customers since they set wholesale prices that are lower than their actual marginal cost. As
mentioned above, an upstream ﬁrm, through a lower wholesale price transforms its downstream
customer into a more aggressive competitor in the downstream market. This means that the
reaction curve of its downstream ﬁrm shifts out. When ﬁrms compete in quantities their
reaction curves are downward slopping and due to the shift the quantity of the rival downstream
ﬁrm decreases while the quantity and gross proﬁts of the own downstream ﬁrm increase. The
upstream ﬁrm transfers, in turn, the higher downstream gross proﬁts upstream via the ﬁxed
11Sacco (2008) and Tishler and Milstein (2009) have also found a U-shaped relationship between product
substitutability and cost-reducing R&D investments. However, they have done so in an oligopolistic one-tier
industry.
8fee.




2(a − c)2m[m(16 − 12γ2 + γ4)2(2 − γ2) − 4(8 − 6γ2 + γ4)2]
[m(4 + (2 − γ)γ)2(4 − γ(2 − γ)) − 4(8 − 6γ2 + γ4)]2 . (9)
3.2 Upstream Merger
In the event of merger, the newly formed upstream monopolist U makes simultaneous and
separate contract oﬀers to the two downstream ﬁrms. In particular, in stage three, the upstream
monopolist U chooses both the wholesale price wi and the ﬁxed fee fi that it oﬀers to Di,t a k i n g
as given its equilibrium contract oﬀer to Dj. Denoting the latter by (wM
j ,fM
j ), wi and fi are













+ fi + fM
j
s.t. ΠDi =[ a − qi(wi,wM
j ) − γqj(wi,wM
j ) − wi]qi(wi,wM
j ) ≥ fi (11)




ΠU =[ a − qi(wi,wM












i ,w j). (12)
From the ﬁrst order conditions of (12), we obtain the equilibrium wholesale prices expressed
in terms of the R&D investments:
wi(xU)=
4c − γ2(a + c) − xU(4 − γ2)
2(2 − γ2)
. (13)
As expected, higher R&D investments, and thus, lower upstream cost translate into lower
wholesale prices, ∂wi
∂xU < 0.
We substitute (13) into (12) and we move to the previous stage, stage two, where U chooses
9xU in order to maximize its proﬁts. The resulting equilibrium R&D investments are:
xM
U =
(a − c)(4 − γ2)(1 − γ)
m(2 − γ2)2 − 4(1 − γ)+γ2 − γ3. (14)
It can be easily conﬁrmed that, in contrast to the separate upstream ﬁrms case, there is no
longer a U-shaped relationship between downstream competition and upstream R&D invest-
ments. Actually, in the merger case, as the goods become closer substitutes, and thus, the
downstream competition becomes more intense, the investment incentives of the merged up-
stream ﬁrm always get weaker,
∂xM
U
∂γ < 0. As mentioned before, one of the eﬀects of an increase
in downstream competition is that the advantage of having lower cost than your rival be-
comes more pronounced. We saw that this eﬀect can cause the U-shaped relationship when
the upstream ﬁrms remain separated. However, when the upstream ﬁr m sm e r g e ,t h i se ﬀect is
internalized by the merged ﬁrm because, in contrast to a separate one, it sells to both of the
downstream ﬁrms.
Comparing the "eﬀective" R&D investments, that is, the cost-reduction that an upstream
ﬁrm enjoys due to its R&D investments, when the upstream ﬁrms merge and when they remain
separated, we ﬁnd the following.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium eﬀective R&D investments are higher when the upstream ﬁrms
merge than when they remain separated, xM
U >x S
i ,i fa n do n l yi fγ<γ x =0 .747.
According to Proposition 1, an upstream horizontal merger can lead to higher R&D invest-
ments. This occurs when the ﬁnal products are not too close substitutes. Why is this so?
There is a volume eﬀect: A merged upstream ﬁrm, in contrast to a separate upstream ﬁrm,
sells to two instead of one downstream ﬁrms, and thus, its output is larger. Since the merged
ﬁrm produces more, its incentives to produce with a lower cost technology are stronger than
those of a separate upstream ﬁrm. As a consequence, a merged ﬁrm has stronger incentives to
invest in R&D. Still, the volume eﬀect is not the only eﬀect in action. There is also the eﬀect
of an increase in downstream competition intensity captured by an increase in product sub-
stitutability. As we saw above, although the impact of an increase in product substitutability
o nR & Di n v e s t m e n t si sa l w a y sn e g a t i v ew h e nﬁr m sm e r g e ,i ti sp o s i t i v ew h e nﬁrms remain
separated and products are suﬃciently close substitutes (γ>0.67). Thus, when the products
are suﬃciently close substitutes, the eﬀect of an increase in downstream competition could
10dominate the volume eﬀect resulting into higher investments for the separated ﬁrm.
It should be noted that our above mentioned ﬁnding contrasts with that of Inderst and
Wey (2003) according to which the incentives of an upstream ﬁrm to reduce its marginal cost
always decrease with an upstream horizontal merger. This diﬀerence is mainly driven by the
fact that in their setting, ﬁrst, the level of R&D investments is exogenous, and second, the
merger does not aﬀect the supplied quantities since the demand of the downstream ﬁrms is
independent.
Substituting (14) into (13) and then both of them into (12), we ﬁnd the equilibrium whole-
sale prices and the upstream proﬁts:
wM
i =
2a(4 − γ2)(−1+γ) − (2 − γ2)m[(a + c)γ2 − 4c]




(a − c)2m(4 − 4γ − γ2 + γ3)
2(4 − 4γ − γ2 + γ3 − 4m +4 γ2m − γ4m)
. (16)
Similarly to the case of separated upstream ﬁrms, the wholesale prices are lower than the
upstream marginal cost, wM
i <c− xM
U . Why? The upstream monopolist suﬀers from a com-
mitment problem.12 The source of this problem is its opportunistic behavior. More speciﬁcally,
when U makes its oﬀer to Di, it has an incentive to behave opportunistically. That is, it has
an incentive to oﬀer a lower wholesale price to Dj in order to transform Dj into an aggressive
competitor in the ﬁnal products market. The upstream monopolist has such an incentive be-
cause, via a higher ﬁxed fee - upstream transfer, it will recoup its losses from selling the input
below marginal cost to Dj and it will also obtain higher net overall proﬁts. This opportunistic
behavior is anticipated by Di.A sar e s u l t ,Di does not accept a wholesale price wi ≥ c − xM
U .
The following Proposition informs us about the impact of an upstream horizontal merger
on the equilibrium wholesale prices.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium wholesale prices are lower when the upstream ﬁrms merge than
when they remain separated, wM
i <w S
i ,i fa n do n l yi fγ<min{1,γw(m)},w i t hdγw/dm > 0,
γw(1.44) = 0.844 and γw(2.4) = 1.
A merger leads to lower wholesale prices unless the products are suﬃciently close substitutes
(γ high) and the R&D technology is suﬃciently eﬃcient (m low). In particular, this holds in
12For more details about the commitment problem see e.g., McAfee and Schwartz (1994), O’Brien and Shaﬀer
(1992), and Rey and Vergé (2004).
11t h ea r e at ot h el e f to ft h eγw c u r v ei nF i g u r e1 . 13 Intuitively, there are two eﬀects in action.
First, there is an output eﬀect that refers to the positive impact of an increase in the wholesale
price wi charged to Di on the output of Dj. The increase in Dj’s output constitutes a negative
eﬀect for the merged upstream ﬁrm since, as we saw above, U subsidizes the downstream
production and sells to both downstream ﬁrms. Internalizing the negative output eﬀect, the
merged upstream ﬁrm has weaker incentives to increase wi than a separate upstream ﬁrm. As
demonstrated in Milliou and Petrakis (2007), in the absence of R&D investments, the output
eﬀect alone would lead to the wholesale prices in the case of merger always being lower than the
respective ones in the no-merger case. In our setting, however, there is an additional eﬀect in
action, a cost eﬀect, due to the presence of R&D investments. The latter reduce the upstream
cost, and thus, aﬀect the wholesale prices that the upstream ﬁrms set. We saw in Proposition
1 that when products are suﬃciently close substitutes, R&D investments are higher when the
ﬁrms remain separated than when they merge. Clearly, this means that when products are
suﬃciently close substitutes, a separated ﬁrm faces a lower cost than a merged ﬁrm, and thus,
it can charge a lower wholesale price. In other words, when products are close substitutes,
the cost eﬀect could dominate the output eﬀect and lead to lower wholesale prices when ﬁrms
remain separated. This occurs only when the R&D technology is suﬃciently eﬃcient because
only then the cost eﬀect is strong. When instead the R&D investments are too costly, ﬁrms
do not invest in R&D a lot and, in turn, the R&D investments do not inﬂuence the wholesale
prices a lot.
4M e r g e r I n c e n t i v e s
We now turn to the examination of the upstream ﬁrms’ incentives to merge. Our main con-
clusion is included in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 The upstream ﬁrms merge, ΠM
U > 2ΠS
Ui,i fa n do n l yi fγ<min{1,γM(m)},
with dγM/dm < 0 and γM(1.44) = 0.961.
Proposition 3 asserts that whether or not the upstream ﬁrms merge depends on the intensity
of downstream competition and the eﬃciency of the R&D technology. The upstream ﬁrms
merge when products are not too close substitutes and the R&D technology is suﬃciently
13Note that in the horizontal axis γ starts from 0.68 while in our model γ ∈ [0,1).
12eﬃcient. This occurs in the region to the left of the γM curve in Figure 1. Intuitively, when
downstream competition is not too ﬁerce, the upstream R&D investments are higher, and
thus, the upstream cost-eﬃciency is stronger, when ﬁrms merge (Proposition 1). Clearly then,
when downstream competition is not too ﬁerce, the upstream ﬁr m sh a v ei n c e n t i v e st om e r g e .
When instead downstream competition is suﬃciently ﬁerce, the merger leads to both lower
upstream cost-eﬃciency and stronger commitment problem, i.e., lower wholesale prices. The
latter occurs only when the R&D technology is suﬃciently ineﬃcient (Proposition 2). Since
when both γ and m are high, the upstream ﬁrms enjoy higher cost-eﬃciency and suﬀer less
from subsidization when they remain separated than when they merge, they have a disincentive
to merge.
In a similar setting but without R&D investments, Milliou and Petrakis (2007) have found
that an upstream merger is never proﬁtable independently of the degree of product substi-
tutability. Therefore, the eﬃciency gains that can be realized when the merger takes place are
pivotal for the proﬁtability of a horizontal merger between upstream parties. In other words,
it is the eﬀe c to ft h em e r g e ro nt h eR & Di n v e s t m e n t st h a tm a k e st h em e r g e rp r o ﬁtable. This
is a novel ﬁnding of our paper.
 














Figure 1: The critical values γx, γM,a n dγw
135 Wholesale Price Contracts
In this Section, we examine what happens when ﬁrms trade using linear contracts, i.e., contracts
that consist of only a wholesale price wi. The last stage of the game is identical to the respective
one under two-part tariﬀs. Thus, the equilibrium quantities are given again by (3).
When the upstream ﬁrms remain separated, in stage three, each upstream ﬁrm Ui faces
the following maximization problem:
max
wi





From the system of ﬁrst order conditions, we obtain the equilibrium wholesale prices in terms
of the R&D investments:
wi(xi,x j)=
(4 + γ)[2c + a(2 − γ)] − 2γxj − 8xi
16 − γ2 . (18)
In stage two, each Ui chooses the R&D investments that maximize its proﬁts. We substitute
(18) into (3) and then into (17) and we diﬀerentiate the latter in terms of xi.D o i n g s o w e
obtain the equilibrium R&D investments:
b xS
i =
4(a − c)(8 − γ2)
m(4 + γ)(2 + γ)(4 − γ2) − 4(8 − γ2)
. (19)
It is important to note that under wholesale price contracts, the R&D investments of a separate
upstream ﬁrm always decrease with product substitutability,
∂e xS
i
∂γ < 0.I nc o n t r a s tt h u st ot h e
two-part tariﬀs case, there is no U-shaped relationship between the intensity of downstream
competition and the R&D investments of a separate upstream ﬁrm. This is mainly due to the
fact that under wholesale price contracts, there are no ﬁxed fees through which a separated
upstream ﬁrm can transfer upstream all the proﬁts of its downstream customer.
Substituting (19) into (18), we obtain the equilibrium wholesale prices:
b wS
i =
m(4 − γ)(2 + γ)(2(a + c) − aγ) − 4a(8 − γ2)
m(4 + γ)(2 + γ)(4 − γ2) − 4(8 − γ2)
. (20)
Note that in contrast to the two-part tariﬀs case, under wholesale price contracts b wS
i >c−b xS
i .




2m(a − c)2[m(4 − γ2)(16 − γ2)2 − 4(8 − γ2)2]
[m(4 + γ)(2 + γ)(4 − γ2) − 4(8 − γ2)]2 . (21)
When the upstream ﬁrms merge, the upstream monopolist U faces the following maximiza-
tion problem in stage three:
max
w1,w2





The resulting equilibrium wholesale prices expressed in terms of the R&D investments are:
wi(xU)=
a + c − xU
2
. (23)
In stage two, U chooses its R&D investments in order to maximize its proﬁts that are
obtained after substituting (23) into (22). The resulting equilibrium R&D investments of the




m(2 + γ) − 1
. (24)
Note that similarly to the no-merger case, the upstream R&D investments decrease with the




Substituting (24) into (23) and (22), we obtain the equilibrium wholesale prices, as well as
the equilibrium proﬁts of the merged upstream ﬁrm:
b wM
i =
m(a + c)(2 + γ) − 2a




2[m(2 + γ) − 1]
. (25)
It should be noted that b wM
i >c− b xM
i . An upstream merged ﬁrm does not face a commitment
problem under wholesale price contracts. The reason is that under wholesale price contracts it
has one (wi) instead of two instruments (wi and fi) at hand. Thus, it does not have incentives to
charge a lower wholesale price to a downstream ﬁrm in order to transform it into an aggressive
competitor because it cannot transfer the downstream proﬁts upstream through a ﬁxed fee.
Proposition 4 Under wholesale price contracts,
(i) the equilibrium eﬀective R&D investments are always higher when the upstream ﬁrms
merge than when they remain separated, b xM
u > b xS
i ,
15(ii) the equilibrium wholesale prices are higher when the upstream ﬁrms merge than when
they remain separated, b wM
i > b wS
i ,i fa n do n l yi fγ>b γw(m),w i t hdb γw/dm < 0 and b γw(1.44) =
0.554,
(iii) the upstream ﬁr m sa l w a y sm e r g e .
Proposition 4(i) asserts that an upstream horizontal merger always reinforces ﬁrm’s R&D
investment incentives. This result is driven by the volume eﬀe c tt h a tw em e n t i o n e di nt h e
intuition of Proposition 1. In contrast to the two-part tariﬀs case, the eﬀect of an increase
in downstream competition does not alter here the result. This is because under wholesale
price contracts an increase in product substitutability always has a negative impact on R&D
investments, independently of whether upstream ﬁrms have merged or not.
Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and Milliou and Petrakis (2007), under wholesale price contracts
and in the absence of R&D investments, have found that the upstream merger always has a
positive impact on wholesale prices. As they have explained this is due to the fact that an
increase in the wholesale price charged to Di has a positive eﬀect on the output of Dj.A
merged upstream ﬁrm in contrast to a separate one, internalizes this positive output eﬀect
and sets higher wholesale prices. In contrast to them, we demonstrate in Proposition 4(ii)
that an upstream merger does not always lead to higher wholesale prices. This occurs because
the upstream R&D investments are higher when the ﬁrms merge (Proposition 4(i)). As a
consequence, a merged ﬁrm enjoys higher cost-eﬃciency which, in turn, allows it to charge
lower wholesale prices than a separated ﬁrm. When the products are diﬀerentiated enough,
t h ec o s te ﬀect dominates the output eﬀect and the wholesale prices turn out to be lower in the
merger case.
According to Proposition 4(iii), an upstream horizontal merger always takes place under
wholesale price contracts. Recall from above that such a merger has two distinct eﬀects.
First, it leads to higher upstream cost eﬃciency (Proposition 4(i)). Second, it leads to higher
wholesale prices at least when the products are close substitutes (Proposition 4(ii)). In other
words, a merger leads to higher upstream price-cost margin, and thus, to higher upstream
proﬁts which, in turn, result in the materialization of the merger.
166 Welfare Analysis and Policy Implications
As we saw in the preceding Sections, a merger between the upstream ﬁr m sa l t e r st h es t r u c t u r e
of the industry and aﬀects ﬁrms’ trading terms and R&D investments. Clearly, these changes
do not leave welfare unaﬀected. In this Section, we investigate the impact of a merger on
consumers welfare (i.e., consumers surplus) and total welfare, as well as we discuss the policy
implications of our ﬁndings.
Proposition 5 Under two-part tariﬀ contracts,
(i) consumers surplus is higher when the upstream ﬁrms merge than when they remain
separated, CSM >CS S,i fa n do n l yi fγ<min{1,γw(m)},
(ii) total welfare is higher when the upstream ﬁrms merge than when they remain separated,
TWM >TW S,i fa n do n l yi fγ<min{1,γTW(m)},w i t hdγTW/dm > 0, γTW(1.44) = 0.868
and γTW(12) = 1.
From Proposition 5(i) and Proposition 2, it follows that, under two-part tariﬀs, a merger has a
positive impact on consumers welfare only when it leads to lower wholesale price contracts.14
That is, when the products are not close substitutes, as well as when the products are close
substitutes and the R&D technology is suﬃciently ineﬃcient. Intuitively, when the products
are not too close substitutes, the merger brings about two eﬃciency-enhancing eﬀects. First, it
increases the eﬀective R&D investments (Proposition 1), and second, it decreases the wholesale
prices (Proposition 2). The wholesale prices lead to higher downstream output, and thus, to
lower prices for the consumers. In contrast, when the products are too close substitutes and
the R&D technology is suﬃciently eﬃcient, the merger harms the consumers since it increases
the wholesale prices. According to Proposition 5(ii), an upstream horizontal merger leads to an
increase in total welfare unless the products are too close substitutes and the R&D technology
is suﬃciently eﬃcient. This ﬁnding is a straightforward implication of the merger’s impact on
upstream proﬁts (Proposition 3) and on consumers welfare (Proposition 5(i)).
14Note that the critical value γw(m) in Proposition 5(i) and Proposition 2 is the same.

















Figure 2: The critical values γM and γw
We know from Proposition 3 that an upstream horizontal merger is materialized in the area
to the left of the γM curve in Figure 2, i.e., in areas A and D. We also know from Proposition
5(i) that an upstream horizontal merger is detrimental to consumers welfare in the area to the
right of the γw curve in Figure 2, i.e., in areas D and C. It follows from this, that only in area
D, where products are close substitutes and the R&D technology is quite eﬃcient, a proﬁtable
merger reduces consumers welfare. In area A, and thus, in the majority of the cases, since
γ [0,1), consumers welfare is enhanced when the merger takes place. It should be noted that
qualitatively similar conclusions arise if we use as criterion total welfare instead of consumers
welfare.
O n em i g h tw o n d e rh o wt h em e r g e rw o u l da ﬀect consumers welfare if ﬁrms traded through
wholesale price contracts. We know from Proposition 4 that, under wholesale price contracts, a
merger always increases the eﬀective R&D investments but that it also leads to stronger double
marginalization, at least when the products are close substitutes. Given this, we ﬁnd that,
under wholesale price contracts, the merger has a negative impact on consumers welfare in
t h ea r e at ot h er i g h to ft h eγW curve in Figure 3, i.e., when the products are close substitutes
as well as when the products are not close substitutes and the R&D technology is suﬃciently
ineﬃcient. Comparing the case of two-part tariﬀs with the case of wholesale price contracts, we
see that although upstream ﬁrms always merge under linear contracts, under two-part tariﬀs
18they merge usually only when strong eﬃciency gains are realized. Furthermore, while under
wholesale price contracts a merger enhances consumers welfare in the area to the left of the
γW in Figure 3, under two-part tariﬀ contracts it enhances consumers welfare in a much larger
area, in the area to the left of the γw curve.













Figure 3: The critical values γw and γW
One might also wonder whether the welfare implications of an upstream horizontal merger
diﬀer from those of a horizontal merger in an one-tier industry. In order to address this we
consider the benchmark case in which there are two Cournot competitors in the market that
produce diﬀerentiated goods and invest in cost-reducing R&D. We ﬁnd that their merger, which
corresponds to the creation of a multi-product monopolist, always leads to both higher eﬀective
R&D investments and higher proﬁts. Moreover, their merger reduces consumers surplus and
total welfare in most of the cases and in a much larger area than an upstream horizontal merger
does.15 This means, ﬁrst, that the welfare implications of a horizontal merger in a one-tier
industry diﬀer from the respective ones of a horizontal merger in the upstream market of a
two-tier industry, and second, that the eﬃciency gains of a horizontal merger in an one-tier
industry usually do not pass on to consumers.
In terms of policy implications, the above ﬁndings suggest that in the assessment of up-
stream horizontal mergers, the antitrust authorities should indeed take into account the po-
tential merger induced cost-synergies since the latter can overturn a merger’s judgement. As
15The analysis is available from the authors upon request.
19it was mentioned in the Introduction, this is in line with the most recent Merger Guidelines
in the U.S. that state that the US Department of Justice “...will not challenge a merger if
eﬃciencies are suﬃcient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm consumers in the relevant
market” (US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 1997, section 4). It is also in line with the new
European Merger Guidelines according to which “... [The Commission] may decide that, as
a consequence of the eﬃciencies the merger brings about, there are no grounds for declar-
ing the merger incompatible with the common market.” (EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
2004/03, art. 77). When, though, is it more likely that the merger’s eﬃciency gains will turn
an otherwise anti-competitive merger into a pro-competitive one? Our results indicate that the
antitrust authorities should be much more cautious in the assessment of horizontal mergers in
one-tier industries than in the assessment of upstream horizontal mergers since in the former
case the eﬃciency gains pass on less to consumers. In addition, our results indicate that up-
stream horizontal mergers should raise more serious concerns for the antitrust authorities in
industries in which downstream competition is quite intense, as well as in industries in which
trading occurs through wholesale price contracts. Instead, the antitrust authorities should
behave more leniently towards upstream horizontal mergers when downstream competition is
weak, as well as when two-part tariﬀ contracts are used.
7 Discussion - Extensions
In this Section, we discuss the robustness of our main results to a number of extensions and
variations of our basic model.
- Uniform pricing: Throughout we have assumed that the upstream monopolist can price
discriminate among the two downstream ﬁrms. One might wonder, however, what would
happen if ﬁrms were operating in a regulated environment in which price discrimination was
not allowed (see e.g., Caprice, 2006). The interesting case for consideration is under two-part
tariﬀ contracts. This is so because under wholesale price contracts the ﬁndings are exactly the
same with and without price discrimination. Under two-part tariﬀs though the behavior of the
upstream monopolist changes drastically when there is uniform pricing. More speciﬁcally, the
upstream monopolist no longer suﬀers from the commitment problem. Thus, its contract oﬀers
are accepted if and only if the participation constraints of the downstream ﬁrms are satisﬁed.
As a consequence, the upstream monopolist is able to commit to a higher wholesale price in
20comparison to the price discrimination case and to capture higher proﬁts exploiting eﬀectively
its market power. Under this setting, the merger turns out to be always proﬁtable and leads
to higher eﬀective R&D investments.16 Whether the merger is desirable for the consumers
and from a social viewpoint depends on the extent of the two opposite eﬀects, the higher
eﬀective R&D investments and the higher wholesale prices. We ﬁnd that unless the products
are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated and the R&D investments are suﬃciently eﬃcient, the merger is
welfare detrimental.
- Secret (interim unobservable) contracts: Our analysis has rested upon the assumption that
contracts are interim observable, that is, they can be fully observed before downstream com-
petition takes place in stage four. Here, we discuss brieﬂy what happens if instead the terms of
t h et w o - p a r tt a r i ﬀ contracts are unobservable by the downstream ﬁrms in the last stage of the
game (see e.g., O’Brien and Shaﬀer, 1992, Rey and Vergé, 2004, and Rey and Tirole, 2006).
In case of merger and interim unobservability, the upstream monopolist charges wi = c − xu.
In contrast thus to the case with interim observability, the wholesale prices are not lower than
the actual upstream marginal cost. This occurs because under interim unobservability the con-
tract terms are not observed before the downstream competition stage, and thus, any possible
strategic eﬀect disappears. This also holds in the no-merger case with interim unobservability
where each pair of vertical chain behaves as if it was vertically integrated and there is no
distortion on the pricing by the upstream ﬁr m s .G i v e nt h i s ,am e r g e ri sa l w a y sp r o ﬁtable and
leads to higher eﬀective R&D and lower wholesale prices. With these two eﬃciency enhancing
eﬀects at play a merger is always pro-competitive.
- Downstream R&D investments: We have assumed throughout that R&D activities are un-
dertaken by the upstream ﬁrm(s). Instead, one could investigate the situation where the
downstream ﬁrms are the ones that invest in R&D. When wholesale price contracts are used,
then the downstream ﬁrms - by imposing their own mark-up - get positive proﬁts. As a result,
they have incentives to participate in R&D activities; however, an upstream horizontal merger,
in the absence of upstream R&D investments, makes the downstream ﬁrms worse-oﬀ.T h i si s
so because an upstream monopolist is in the position to charge higher wholesale prices than
an independent upstream ﬁrm. Consequently, the proﬁt squeeze, due to the merger, weakens
the downstream ﬁrm’s incentives to invest in R&D. It follows that an upstream horizontal
16The equilibrium analysis is available from the authors upon request.
21merger in this case works to the detriment of consumers for two reasons. First, it increases the
wholesale prices (double marginalization), and second, it reduces the eﬀective R&D (decreases
eﬃciency).17 When two-part tariﬀ contracts are used, things become more complex since we
should introduce some bargaining power to each party in order to be able to analyze the down-
stream ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in R&D. This is necessary because if the downstream parties
obey to any take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers by the upstream ﬁrms then they are left with no surplus
(the upstream ﬁrms obtain all the downstream ﬁrms’ proﬁts through the ﬁx e df e e s )a n dR & D
incentives disappear.
- Downstream price competition: In our basic model, downstream ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated
goods and compete in quantities. Here, we brieﬂy discuss what would happen if downstream
ﬁrms compete in prices. As demonstrated by Singh and Vives (1984), the demand function
(1) faced by ﬁrm i can be rewritten in the following way:
qi(pi,p j)=
a(1 − γ)
1 − γ2 −
1
1 − γ2pi +
γ
1 − γ2pj.
Using the above demand function and assuming that in the last stage of the game downstream
ﬁrms choose simultaneously and independently their prices, we are able to conﬁrm the merger’s
eﬃciency-enhancing eﬀects. In particular, we ﬁnd that under two-part tariﬀs, similarly to the
case with Cournot competition, the merger leads to an increase in the eﬀective R&D invest-
ments if and only if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated. We also ﬁnd that the merger leads
to lower wholesale prices unless the products are suﬃciently close substitutes. We should note
though that now upstream ﬁrms do not subsidize the downstream production because since
prices, in contrast to quantities, are strategic complements, an upstream ﬁrm does not wish its
downstream customer to behave as an aggressive downstream competitor. As a consequence,
an upstream merged ﬁrm faces a less severe commitment problem under Bertrand than under
Cournot competition. It turns out that under Bertrand competition, independently of the
intensity of downstream competition, the merger is desirable both from the upstream ﬁrms’
viewpoint and the welfare viewpoint.
17The equilibrium analysis under wholesale price contracts is available from the authors upon request.
228 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have examined whether or not horizontal mergers in upstream markets
generate eﬃciency gains, as well as whether their potential eﬃciency gains can overcome their
anti-competitive eﬀects in terms of welfare. We have done so in a setting where both the
upstream ﬁrms’ merger decision and R&D investments are endogenous.
We have shown that when ﬁrms trade through two-part tariﬀ contracts, merger incentives
are present when downstream competition is not too ﬁerce and the R&D investments are not
too costly. This ﬁnding contrasts with the respective ﬁnding of Milliou and Petrakis (2007),
according to which the upstream ﬁrms never merge under two-part tariﬀ contracts. Our ﬁnding
is driven by the presence of R&D investments and the positive impact of merger on them when
products are not too close substitutes. In other words, when downstream competition is not
too strong, the merger gives rise to eﬃciency gains. The higher R&D investments translate
into higher upstream cost-eﬃciency and lower wholesale prices and the latter lead, in turn, to
lower prices for the consumers; hence, when products are not too close substitutes, the merger
can be both proﬁtable and pro-competitive.
We have also shown that under wholesale price contracts, even though the merger always
leads to higher R&D investments, it can also lead to higher wholesale prices when the products
are close substitutes. The severity of the double marginalization problem increases then and
the consumers end up paying higher prices. As a result, although the upstream ﬁrms always
choose to merge, their merger reduces consumers welfare when downstream competition is
strong.
Our ﬁndings clearly suggest that, in the treatment of upstream horizontal mergers, the an-
titrust authorities should take into account the mergers’ impact on ﬁrm’s investment incentives,
i.e., their potential eﬃciency eﬀects; however, their decision of whether or not they should al-
low horizontal mergers between upstream ﬁrms when there are potential eﬃciency gains should
depend on a number of market characteristics, such as the form of vertical contract and the
intensity of downstream competition.
Throughout the paper we have restricted our attention to situations where the upstream
ﬁrms have all the bargaining power and the relations between the upstream and the downstream
ﬁrms, in the absence of merger, are exclusive. It would be interesting to extend our analysis by
examining what would happen when ﬁrms negotiate over their trading terms, as well as when
23the separated upstream ﬁrms have non-exclusive relations with the downstream ﬁrms.
9A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :We calculate the diﬀerence of the equilibrium R&D investments in
the case of an upstream merger (14) with the respective ones in the case of separate upstream
ﬁrms (7): Mx(γ,m) ≡ xM
U − xS
i . Setting Mx(γ,m)=0and solving for γ,w eﬁnd γx =0 .747.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that limγ→0Mx = m
1−3m+2m2 > 0 and limγ→1Mx = 12
12−25m < 0 for all m
that satisfy Assumption 1. It follows that Mx(γ,m) > 0 if γ<γ x and Mx(γ,m) ≤ 0 if γ ≥ γx.
¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :We calculate the diﬀerence of the equilibrium wholesale prices in the
case of an upstream merger (15) with the respective ones in the case of separate upstream ﬁrms
(8): Mw(γ,m) ≡ wM
i −wS
i . Setting Mw(γ,m)=0and solving for γ,w eﬁnd γw(m)=m−1
w (γ),
where mw(γ)=
4(32 − 48γ − 24γ2 +4 4 γ3 − 8γ5 + γ6)
γ3(−32 + 40γ2 − 14γ4 + γ6)
.
It can be checked that dmw
dγ > 0.S i n c e dmw
dγ =1 /(
dγ
dm), it follows that
dγw
dm > 0.W e ﬁnd
that mw(γ)=1 .44 i fa n do n l yi fγ =0 .844.T h u s ,γw(1.44) = 0.844.M o r e o v e r ,w eﬁnd that
mw(1) = 2.4.C l e a r l yt h e n ,γw(2.4) = 1.
Finally, we ﬁnd limγ→0Mw = − m
1−3m+2m2 < 0 for all m that satisfy Assumption 1 and
limγ→1Mw = 36−15m
−24+50m > 0 i fa n do n l yi fm<2.4.T h u s , i f m>2.4,t h e nMw(γ,m) < 0 if
γ<γ w(m) and Mw(γ,m) ≥ 0 if γ>γ w(m).O t h e r w i s e ,Mw(γ,m) < 0 for all γ. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :We calculate the diﬀerence of the equilibrium proﬁts of the merged
upstream ﬁrm (15) with the sum of the equilibrium proﬁts of the two separate upstream ﬁrms
(8): MM(γ,m) ≡ ΠM
U − 2ΠS




4[1024(1 − γ) − 2048γ2 + 2304γ3 + 1600γ4 − 1920γ5 − 640γ6 + 720γ7+
158γ8 − 116γ9 − 24γ10 +6 γ11 +2 γ12 +
p
(8 − 6γ2 + γ4)2R]
γ4(4 + 2γ − γ2)2(4 − 2γ − γ2)2(8 + 4γ − 3γ2 − γ3)
,
with R ≡ 16384+γ(−32768+γ(−24576+γ(90112+γ(−15360+γ(55296+γ(45568+γ(−46080
+γ(−9344+γ(18112+γ(192+γ(−3776+γ(192+γ(464+γ(464+γ(−36+γ(2+γ))))))))))))))))).
24It can be checked that dmM
dγ < 0.S i n c edmw
dγ =1 /(
dγ
dm), it follows that
dγM
dm < 0.M o r e o v e r ,
it can be checked that mw(γ)=1 .44 if and only if γ =0 .961.T h u s ,γw(1.44) = 0.961.
Finally, we ﬁnd limγ→0MM = m
2−6m+4m2 > 0 and limγ→1Mw =
(288−200m)m
2(12−25m)2 < 0 for all m
that satisfy Assumption 1. Thus, MM(γ,m) > 0 if γ<γ M and MM(γ,m) ≥ 0 if γ>γ M. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :(i) Using (24) and (19), we calculate:
b xM
U − b xS
i =
m(2 + γ)(32 − 16γ + γ3)
[−1+m(2 + γ)]D1(γ,m)
, (26)
where D1(γ,m)=m(4 + γ)(2 + γ)(4 − γ)2 − 4(8 − γ2). The numerator of (26) is clearly
positive. Regarding its denominator, we note that [−1+m(2 + γ)] > 0 while for D1(γ,m)
we ﬁnd that ∂D1
∂m > 0.T h u s ,D1(γ,m) takes its smallest value when m → 1.44.W eﬁnd that
limm→1.44D1(γ,m) > 0. It follows from this that D1(γ,m) > 0. Since both the numerator and
the denominator of (26) are positive, we have that xM
U − xS
i > 0.
(ii) Using (25) and (20), we calculate:
b wM





where N1(γ,m)=mγ(4 − γ)(2 + γ)(4 + γ) − 32.
We know from the proof of part (i) that the denominator of (27) is positive. Regarding its
numerator of (27), setting N1(γ,m)=0and solving for m,w eﬁnd:
b mw(γ)=
32
γ(32 + 16γ − 2γ2 − γ3)
.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that limγ→0N1(γ,m)=−32 < 0 and limγ→1N1(γ,m)=−32 + 45m>0.
We ﬁnd that N1(γ,1.44) = 0 i fa n do n l yi fγ =0 .554.T h u s ,b wM
i − b wS
i > 0 if γ>b γw(m) and
b wM
i − b wS
i 6 0 if γ<b γw(m),w i t hb γw(m)=b m−1
w (γ). Finally, it can be checked that
de γw
dm < 0.
(iii) Using (25) and (21), we calculate:
b ΠM
U − 2b ΠS
i =
mN2(γ,m)
2(2m + γm− 1)[γ2(4 − 24m)+3 2 mγ − 2mγ3 + mγ4 − 32(1 − 4m)]2, (28)
where N2(γ,m)=−28m2γ6 +4 m2γ7 + m2γ8 − 1024(1 − 4m)+mγ3(16γ2 − 128)(1 − 8m)
+256γ2(1 − 6m +4 m2) − 16γ4(1 − 6m − 8m2).
The denominator of (28) is clearly positive since from Assumption 1 we have m>1.44.
25Regarding the numerator we ﬁnd that ∂N2
∂m > 0. Thus, the numerator takes its smallest value
when m → 1.44.W eﬁnd that limm→1.44N2 > 0. Since both the numerator of (28) are positive,
it follows that b πM
U − 2b πS
i > 0. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :(i) Consumers surplus is given by:
CSk = qi(wk
i ,wk
i )2 + γqi(wk
i ,wk
i )2,
with k = M,S and qi(wk
i ,wk
i ) g i v e nb y( 3 ) .
We calculate the diﬀerence MCS(γ,m) ≡ CSM −CSS. Setting MCS(γ,m)=0and solving
for γ,w eﬁnd γCS(m)=γw(m). See the properties of γw(m) in the proof of Proposition 2.
Finally, we ﬁnd that limγ→0MCS(γ,m) > 0 for all m and limγ→1MCS(γ,m) < 0 if and
only if m<2.4. It follows that when m<2.4 then CSM −CSS > 0 i fa n do n l yi fγ<γ w(m).
When instead m ≥ 2.4,t h e nCSM − CSS > 0 for all γ.
(ii) Total welfare in the case of upstream horizontal merger and in the case of separate
upstream ﬁrms is given respectively by:
TWM = CSM + ΠM
U and TWS = CSS +2 ΠS
Ui.
We calculate the diﬀerence MTW(γ,m) ≡ TWM − TWS. Setting MTW(γ,m)=0and
solving for γ,w eﬁnd γTW(m).I tc a nb ec h e c k e dt h a tdγTW/dm > 0. Setting MTW(γ,m)=
1.44 and solving for γ,w eﬁnd γ =0 .868.T h u s ,γTW(1.44) = 0.849.
Finally, we ﬁnd that limγ→0MTW(γ,m)=
m(2−9m+8m2)
4(1−3m+2m2)2 > 0 for all m and limγ→1MTW(γ,m)=
−12+m
−24+50m < 0 i fa n do n l yi fm<12. It follows that when m<12 then TWM − TWS > 0 if
a n do n l yi fγ<γ TW(m). When instead m ≥ 12,t h e nTWM − TWS > 0 for all γ. ¥
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